The role of constitutional court in the context of structural political inestability in Ecuador

Abstract

The role of high constitutional judges has recently gained particular significance in Ecuador. Political instability, institutional fragility, and recurring cycles of power concentration since the enactment of the 2008 Constitution have shaped the country’s democratic landscape, creating a context in which traditional checks and balances often prove insufficient. This article examines the role of the Constitutional Court in addressing the structural political instability that characterizes Ecuador. The analysis is framed within the counter-majoritarian debate and grounded in the principles, concepts, and theoretical frameworks of Constitutional Law, considering their interaction with the State’s political-institutional context. Employing a socio-legal research methodology with a qualitative approach, the study utilizes analysis-synthesis techniques alongside content analysis of doctrinal and academic sources. The findings indicate that, unlike in more stable contexts such as Europe or the United States, high constitutional judges in Ecuador must adopt a more proactive and robust role to address structural deficiencies, curb political power excesses, and safeguard constitutional supremacy.